University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 17
Number 2 Copyright Symposium, Part I

Article 12

1-1-1992

Presentation by James E. Schatz, Esq.
James E. Schatz

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schatz, James E. (1992) "Presentation by James E. Schatz, Esq.," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol.
17: No. 2, Article 12.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/12

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

PRESENTATION BY JAMES E. SCHATZ, ESQ.
MR. SCHATZ: As my role, and I think the role of other people
who are going to be commenting on the main presentations, was described to me, it was to raise some questions that would lead to discussion. And so while I submitted a paper that discussed many of the
things that Professor Patterson, and a few of the things that Professor
Raskind, have talked about, I am going to limit myself to things that I
think would be useful for discussion.
For instance, I discussed, at least on a couple of pages, Professor
Patterson's view on the Statute of Anne and the Copyright Clause,
which I disagree with. I think everybody can read that. But I think it is
not that interesting what happened in the 1700's, quite frankly, and it's
not very relevant to today with computers, TVs, and CD-ROMS, and
who knows what other developments in the future.
Let me start off with one of the things that Professor Raskind said
and, I think, Professor Karjala talked about also, and that is that the
discussion of "facts" in Feist was not very helpful. I couldn't agree
more. I think that what is going to happen is that, based on Feist,
courts are going to be very likely to try to find out what "facts" means,
and they are going to be trying to separate facts from expression and
from selection, coordination, and arrangement, and I don't think they
are going to do a very good job.
Professor Raskind indicated several examples where information
really is not "facts" and borders more on expression, and so, I think
you are going to have a lot of misleading discussion. If courts believe
that alleged facts should be protected from a particular taking, they
are going to stretch to find that those facts are either expression or are
really selected, coordinated, or arranged in a certain way that allows
protection from the taking in question. I think you are going to have a
lot of strained interpretations and I am not sure that that is going to be
particularly helpful in pushing the law forward.
I do believe that courts will find protection. And some laws, like
Professor Raskind's example of misappropriation, are going to rise to
protect against what courts consider to be unfair takings. One of the
things I cover in my paper, which I would like to cover here because I
would like to see what other people's comments are on it, is that, in
fact, state laws in this area are not preempted. Let me discuss that for
a minute.
We are now faced with a situation after Feist where the labor and
expense necessary to create a factual compilation is not protected in
and of itself by copyright. Protection is not needed for literary expresPublished by eCommons, 1991
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sion as that is already protected by copyright, but rather what we are
talking about is protection for the huge investments in time and effort
it takes to develop factual compilations.
Feist makes it clear that Congress has no power under the Constitution to extend copyright protection for the collection and assemblage
of facts however great the investment of time and effort by the compiler. This follows from the Court's conclusion that originality is a constitutional requirement for the extension of copyright protection and
the Court's characterization of facts as bits of information that "do not
owe their origin to an act of authorship."
If Congress has not been delegated the power to protect the collection and assemblage of factual material under'the Copyright and Patent Clause, then under the Tenth Amendment that power may be reserved to the states. Certainly, if Congress lacks the constitutional
power to protect the collection and assemblage of factual material, as
the Court implicitly held in Feist, then it can't act to preempt state
attempts to protect such effort from unauthorized appropriation. In
other words, if Congress can't act in that area, then it cannot act in the
other way.
In fact, Congress itself has acknowledged that in certain circumstances the states may provide protection for the presentation. of facts,
apart from their selection, coordination, and arrangement. In passing
the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress said, in the legislative history, that
misappropriation is not necessarily synonymous with copyright
infringement:
For example, state law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy
against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts, i.e., not the literary expression, constituting hot news
whether in the traditional mode of the InternationalNews Service case
or in the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, and financial databases.
The states, therefore, can act to protect a compiler's investment of time
and labor in collecting and assembling the data contained in factual
compilations.
In his paper, and I believe he spoke about this briefly, Professor
Raskind postulated that, under Bonito Boats, a state statute protecting
the collection and assemblage of information contained in a directory,
database, index or other form of assembled information would likely be
preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act. The opinion in Bonito
Boats, however, implies that Congress has the power to protect the unpatented boat hulls at issue in that case, but had elected not to provide
patent protection. As was stated there by the Supreme Court, taken
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/12
together, the novelty and non-obviousness requirements express a con-
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gressional determination that the purposes behind the Patent Clause
are best served by free competition and exploitation of what is already
available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from
publicly available materials. Thus, since Congress chose not to provide
patent protection in such cases where it could have, this was an area
that Congress felt was best left unregulated and this congressional decision was accorded the same preemptive force as a decision to regulate.
Based on Feist, however, it is clear that Congress does not have
the power to grant copyright protection to the collection and assemblage of facts in a factual compilation. As a result, Bonito Boats does
not appear to mandate preemption of a state law protecting such effort.
One last point. Professor Patterson spoke a lot about the complaints about what has happened to copyright law in that it has supposedly allowed people to monopolize and censor, and that the copyright
law has been turned on its head. But what he did not say, and what I
think is the most important response, is that copyright is not much of a
right. He made it sound like it is a great monopoly and provides a great
censorship tool, but it really does not provide much of a tool because all
it prohibits is copying. You can create the same thing, as indicated in
many copyright treatises, as long as you do it independently. So, if you
want to create a collection of public domain material, even if there is
an absolute prohibition on copying any other compilation of it anywhere, you still have a right to go to the public domain source and
collect the same data in exactly the same format as long you are not
copying it.
You can exercise independent creation, or you can look at what is
available and say that sounds like a great idea and go copy the information from the same place. There may be a problem with copying the
selection and arrangement, but the point is that the copyright, that provides this monopoly or censorship right, is not much of a right. It does
not really protect much. It is not like a patent that absolutely prohibits
people from doing whatever it is that's patented. Copyright only prohibits copying, or, as I think people in the industry would say, piracy or
rip-offs. Thank you.
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